Practical Provably Correct Voter Privacy Protecting End-to-End Voting Employing Multiparty Computations and Split Value Representations of Votes

Working Paper No.: 
Date Published: 
Ronald L. Rivest, MIT CSAIL
Michael O. Rabin, Harvard, SEAS, Columbia SEAS

Abstract. Continuing the work of Rabin and Rivest [1] we present another simple and fast method for conducting end to end voting and allowing public verification of correctness of the announced vote tallying results. This method was referred to in [1] as the SV/VCP method. In the present note voter privacy protection is achieved by use of a simple form of Multi Party Computations (MPC). At the end of vote tallying process, random permutations of the cast votes are publicly posted in the clear, without identification of voters or ballot ids. Thus vote counting and assurance of correct form of cast votes are directly available. Also, a proof of the claim that the revealed votes are a permutation of the concealed cast votes is publicly posted and verifiable by any interested party.

Advantages of this method are: Easy understandability by non-­‐cryptographers, implementers and ease of use by voters and election officials. Direct handling of complicated ballot forms. Independence from any specialized primitives. Speed of vote-­‐tallying and correctness proving: elections involving a million voters can be tallied and proof of correctness of results posted within a few minutes.

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