



CALIFORNIA VOTES

THE PROMISE OF
ELECTION DAY
REGISTRATION

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ is a professor of political science at Caltech and the co-director of the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project. He joined the Caltech faculty in 1992.

Alvarez has focused most of his research and teaching on the study of electoral politics in the United States. His first book, *Information and Elections*, was published in 1997, and he has published a number of articles on electoral behavior and public opinion in the United States and other advanced industrial democratic nations. His second book, *Hard Choices, Easy Answers*, a sweeping study of American public opinion about divisive social and political issues, was co-written with John Brehm and will be published by Princeton University Press in June 2002.

Currently Alvarez is working on three new book projects. The first, with Thad Hall, is a study of the feasibility of Internet voting and is called “Point, Click, and Vote.” The second project, with Jonathan Nagler, examines voting behavior in primary elections and focuses on whether or not American voters behave strategically in primary elections; this book is tentatively titled “The Expressive American Voter.” The third book project, “Manufacturing a Gender Gap,” is being written with Edward McCaffery and examines the causes of gender differences in opinions about economic issues.

Alvarez has received a number of honors and grants for his work in political science. He was a John M. Olin Faculty Fellow (1994–95) and a John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Faculty Fellow (1994, 1997, 1999, and 2002). Alvarez received the Sprague Award with John Brehm for their work on public opinion, and the Durr Award with Jonathan Nagler for their work on modeling elections. Also, Alvarez has received financial support for his research from the National Science Foundation, the IBM Corporation, and the Carnegie Corporation. Alvarez is the editor of a book series, Techniques of Political Analysis, and is on the editorial boards of a number of academic journals, including *American Journal of Political Science*, *American Politics Quarterly*, *Election Law Journal*, *Political Behavior*, *Political Analysis*, *The Journal of Politics*, and *Political Research Quarterly*. He was the editor of *The Political Methodologist* from 1993 to 1996.

Alvarez received his B.A. in political science from Carleton College in 1986. He received his M.A. and Ph.D. from Duke University in 1990 and 1992, respectively.




STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE is a professor of political science at MIT and the co-director of the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project. An expert on American politics, he studies elections, democracy, and the mass media. He joined the MIT faculty in 1994.

In addition to his work on the Voting Technology projects, his current research projects include campaign finance, congressional elections, and party politics. Ansolabehere was awarded a \$93,000 Carnegie Corporation Fellowship last spring to research and write a book entitled *The Rise of Money in American Politics*. He was one of 12 recipients of grants under a new Carnegie program supporting fundamental research on social change.

Ansolabehere is on the boards of the National Election Study and the Canadian Election Study. He is also the co-director of the MIT Congressional Staff Seminar, which conducts annual seminars on science and technology for senior congressional staff.

With Professor Shanto Iyengar of Stanford, Ansolabehere has written *Going Negative: How Political Advertising Alienates and Polarizes the American Electorate* (Free Press, 1996) and *The Media Game* (Macmillan, 1993). Ansolabehere was selected a National Fellow by the Hoover Institution in 1993; received the 1996 Goldsmith Book Prize for *Going Negative*; and served as a Harry S. Truman Fellow from 1982 to 1986. Before joining the MIT faculty in 1993, Ansolabehere taught at the University of California at Los Angeles from 1989 to 1993. He earned a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University in 1989 and a B.A. in political science and B.S. in economics from the University of Minnesota in 1984.



This report was prepared with the assistance of Melanie Goodrich and Catherine Wilson. The section about the history of voter registration systems in California was co-written by Melanie Goodrich; the technical appendix and the section on the analysis of EDR's effects on turnout were co-written by Catherine Wilson. We thank Ben Highton for his comments on a previous draft, and the Demos staff for its assistance and input.

A vibrant, inclusive democracy is the lifeblood of a just society. Such a democracy depends on the fullest possible participation by Americans in elections and all areas of democratic decision making. Since the 2000 election, important reform initiatives have sought to improve the technology and processes of election systems, as well as to advance America's historic march toward a democracy in which everyone truly has a chance to participate. As the former secretary of state of Connecticut, I know well the challenges of making our electoral system as open and inclusive as it can be.

Election day registration (EDR) is one important reform that has the potential both to reduce problems at polling places and to increase voter turnout. Six states currently use EDR: Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In these states, all citizens who arrive at the polls have a maximum chance to participate, even if their names have accidentally been left off voter rolls. The six states with EDR also have some of the highest rates of voting in the United States. EDR is especially effective at increasing voting by young people.

If election day registration makes sense for states like Minnesota and Wisconsin, does it also make sense for California? This report addresses that question in detail. The report was researched and written by two of America's leading scholarly experts on voting systems and technology: Professor A. Michael Alvarez of the California Institute of Technology and Professor Stephen Ansolabehere of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

In researching the potential impact of EDR in California, as well as the challenges for its successful implementation, Professors Alvarez and Ansolabehere drew on a wide range of sources. They conducted interviews with election administration officials in states with EDR and consulted widely with election officials in California. They also drew heavily on data provided by the Census Bureau to analyze the impact of EDR on voter participation and to project its likely impact in California. In addition, the authors drew on a wide range of existing scholarship of voting and participation.

The conclusions of this report are that election day registration could successfully be implemented in California with few problems or excessive costs; could help reduce the problems that voters often face in polling places; and could increase voter turnout in California by as much as 9 percentage points—bringing nearly two million new voters to the polls. Young people and those who move frequently would be most likely to benefit from EDR.

We at Demos hope this report can make a contribution to public discussion now underway in California about electoral reform. I wish to thank Professors Alvarez and Ansolabehere for undertaking this research, as well as those election officials in California and elsewhere who assisted with the research.



Miles Rapoport
President, Demos

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION WILL PRODUCE HIGHER VOTER PARTICIPATION IN CALIFORNIA.

- States that have adopted EDR have witnessed a 3 to 6 percentage point increase in participation among the voting-age population.
- Voting among young people and those who have moved in the last six months is nearly 15 percentage points higher in states with EDR.
- California might experience an even larger increase in turnout—perhaps by as much as 9 percentage points—because California has a younger and more mobile population.

ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION WILL INCREASE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE ON THE REGISTRATION ROLLS IN CALIFORNIA.

- In states with EDR, up to 90 percent of the electorate is registered.
- Higher registration rates facilitate the distribution of voter information pamphlets and better communication about where and when to vote.

ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION WORKS IN THE STATES THAT CURRENTLY USE IT, AND PEOPLE LIKE IT.

- Election day registration is one-step voting.
- In states that use EDR, most voters register at the polls.
- Election officials in states with EDR like the fact that they have more oversight over the registration process.

VOTER REGISTRATION FRAUD CAN BE MINIMIZED IN CALIFORNIA UNDER ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION.

- Stricter penalties for attempted registration fraud under EDR will minimize risks.
- As most voter registrations under EDR occur at the polling place and require some form of identification, voter registration will be more secure than under the current system in California.
- States that currently use EDR have low rates of registration fraud because they put into place appropriate safeguards to minimize risks.

ELECTION DAY VOTER REGISTRATION SHOULD NOT SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE COSTS OF ELECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA.

- EDR will require new expenditures, but it may save money on other items, especially pre-election staffing. Per-capita election administration costs in major cities using EDR—including Minneapolis and Milwaukee—are approximately \$3.50 per voting-age person.
- California counties now spend between \$3 and \$4 per voting-age person to run elections, though some counties spend considerably more.

THE MAIN CHALLENGE WITH EDR: GETTING PEOPLE TO VOTE IN THE RIGHT PLACE.

- The year after Minnesota adopted EDR, Minneapolis reported that half of all polling place registrations happened in the wrong polling place. Today less than 1 percent are reported to occur in the wrong location.
- The problem can be overcome with appropriate voter education before election day, in the polling place, and after the election. These activities are routine in states that use EDR, and have little apparent fiscal impact.

INTRODUCTION

Everyone who wishes to vote should be able to vote without difficulty, and all votes should be cast and counted honestly.

Voter registration serves these goals two ways.

First, voter registration is designed primarily to guard against voter fraud.¹ Clean and trusted elections require some form of voter authentication, and voter registration can prevent fraud. American history is riddled with examples of vote buying, roving voters, and stuffed ballot boxes. A public and valid list of who is eligible to vote provides a ready check against such fraud. Poll workers authenticate each voter when they come to the polls, and after the election is over registration lists can be used to look for individual cases of fraud or systematic irregularities.



Second, voter registration provides counties with a list of eligible voters with whom to communicate information about where and when to vote. Some state governments, including California's, use the voter lists to distribute voter pamphlets telling registered voters where and when to vote, as well as information about candidates and measures on the ballot.

But there are difficulties with voter registration.

Voter registration adds another step to voting that creates a barrier to participation for many people. Citizens must find out how and where to register, and, in California and 42 other states, must register well in advance of election day. People move frequently and sometimes do not update their

registration. Also, errors in the voter registration system can disenfranchise voters. Citizens who make every effort to register can be thwarted by mere clerical errors.²

Voter registration is also a hard and costly system to manage. County election offices must maintain highly accurate and very current lists of every voter. It is nearly impossible to check the validity of voter registration records because the system is rarely integrated with other county and state data, such as driver's licenses or tax collections.

A series of reforms have sought to lower the barriers to registration while still maintaining the integrity of the system. Perhaps the most sweeping of these reforms is the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA, sometimes called the "motor voter" act), which allows voters to *apply* to register to vote at registries of motor vehicles and other government offices. In 2001, California took a further step in making it easier to register by moving the closing date for registration from 29 days before the election to 15 days before the election.

Election officials in California have experienced problems implementing both reforms. Fifteen days may not provide enough time to process the large number of applications that arrive at the last minute. Problems with NVRA are more wide ranging. Under NVRA, applications come from other government offices, especially departments of motor vehicles, and from registration drives and through the mail. Most new applications to register now come through these other routes, rather than through the county election office. Many of these new avenues for registration have proved unreliable. Some applications are never delivered. Some applications are not correctly filled out, usually because the person forgot to sign the application. Other government offices, such as those devoted to motor vehicles and welfare, provide little support or instruction to voters; after all, voting is not a primary responsibility of these offices.

How might election day registration affect voting in California?

The central concerns with election day registration are participation and fraud. Allowing people to register at the polls might increase participation, but it might also increase fraud, especially coordinated efforts to steal elections.

The chief argument for EDR is that it would increase voter participation. A simpler registration process would

remove an important barrier to the voting process, especially for people who have difficulty keeping their registration status current. Voter participation nationwide and in California has declined steadily over the last 30 years. By making it easier for citizens to vote, EDR might produce a substantial, long-term increase in voting.

Such a reform would profoundly alter the main system in place for preventing and detecting voter fraud: registration. Currently, each county election office establishes a list of valid voters—those who have registered in advance. On election day, the poll workers at the precinct check each voter against that list to make sure each voter hasn't already cast a ballot and is voting in the right location. After election day, election officials use the lists to check the integrity of the voting process. Without a list developed in advance of election day, can we still guard against people voting more than once or in the wrong place?

In addition to the broad concerns of participation and integrity, there is a host of important concerns about how to administer election day registration. Will EDR be too difficult for poll workers, leading to long lines and worse service at the polls? How will new voters know where to vote, and will large numbers vote in the wrong place by accident? Will the county election office lose control of voter registration? Will this system be unduly expensive?

To answer these questions, we examine the experiences and practices in states using EDR and compare those experiences with states that do not have EDR, especially California. We compare registration and voting in states with EDR and states without EDR. To gain a clear understanding of fraud and registration problems, we study in depth two metropolitan areas using EDR: Minneapolis–St. Paul, Minnesota, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. These cities are most similar to California cities.

The results are quite striking.

- In the long run, states that have adopted EDR show an increase in participation rates of 3 to 6 percentage points of the voting-age population. In California, such an increase would translate into as many as 1.2 million new voters.

- Voting rates of young people and of people who have moved recently are especially likely to improve, but the partisan composition of the electorate may be little changed.
- Fraud is minimal, in part because of precautions taken by the states.
- Administration is in some ways more complicated but in other ways improved. The quality of service at the polling place is no worse, and may be better. With EDR almost all registrations are done under the auspices of the election office and after providing some

Voter participation nationwide and in California has declined steadily over the last 30 years. By making it easier for citizens to vote, EDR might produce a substantial, long-term increase in voting.

form of identification. Fewer people will register by mail, through registration drives, or at other government offices. The main difficulty is making sure that new voters go to the right polling place.

Simply put, if EDR is done right, Californians would enjoy an easier way to vote, without an increase in fraud. County election offices might be able to regain greater control and oversight over voter registration. If EDR is not properly implemented, however, there may be serious problems. The key elements to proper implementation include:

- Requirements for proper identification, including driver's licenses, utility bills, or affidavits signed by registered voters.
- Development and implementation of procedures that will get prospective voters to the right polling places.
- Changes in polling place organization and increased polling place staff.

WHAT IS ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION?

HOW DOES ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION WORK IN OTHER STATES?

The requirement that one register before election day introduces a second step to the process of voting. Not only must one go to the polls on election day, in California one must also make the effort to register two weeks to a month in advance of election day. This additional step is widely seen as an obstacle to voting, especially for those who have never voted before, who have moved recently, or who have difficulty navigating government bureaucracy.

Seven states have just one step in the voting process. Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming allow voters to register at polling places on election day. North Dakota has no registration. Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have had substantial experience

Election day registration, sometimes called same-day registration, allows a voter with proper identification to register on election day.

with election day registration dating back to the 1970s. The other three states all adopted election day registration in the early 1990s, to avoid compliance with the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA).

Election day registration, sometimes called same-day registration, allows a voter with proper identification to register on election day. The implementation varies across the states.

Every state that allows voters to register at the polls requires some form of identification for voter authentication. Idaho requires some form of photographic identification and proof of residency. Minnesota and Wisconsin allow voters to bring a range of identification, including a driver's license with a current address or a photo ID with an out-of-date address and a current utility bill. Minnesota also allows a voter who is registered in a precinct to vouch for someone who is not registered.

A KEY CHALLENGE: GETTING PEOPLE TO THE RIGHT POLLING PLACES

Getting people to the right polling place is a key element of election day registration.³ Polling places in states with election day registration are equipped with detailed maps and address lists so that poll workers can determine exactly where someone is supposed to vote. If someone is in the correct precinct, they are registered and allowed to vote. If someone is in the wrong place, they are instructed where they should go to register and vote.

In addition, states with election day registration have a backup system. If the poll worker questions whether the voter is in fact eligible to vote, or if the voter insists on voting even though he or she is at the wrong polling place, then the voter is allowed to register, the voter's ballot is sealed, and the validity of the registration is checked after the close of the election. Such challenges are very rare in states with EDR.

California currently uses such a process, called provisional balloting, when a question arises about a voter's registration. In Los Angeles County in 2000, approximately 4 percent of voters cast provisional ballots, and about two-thirds of these were valid. EDR will probably reduce the hassle of casting provisional ballots at the polls and of checking them after the election.

The six states with election day registration vary in the procedures to facilitate registration and voting in polling places. Polling place workers help citizens determine which polling place is appropriate, and by all accounts this is an efficient polling place practice that minimizes long lines and other types of delays in voting. Each precinct in Minnesota has a separate line for registration at the polling place. Polling place workers receive a two-hour training session that teaches them how to handle registration requests, how to authenticate new voters, and what to do if there are questions about the eligibility of a person who is attempting to register.

After election day, the list of voters registered at the polls is added to the existing registration rolls. Each new registration is validated by the central office and entered into the registration system. Some states, such as Minnesota, have integrated statewide registration systems. All counties in Minnesota enter the data into a common computer program. The computerized registration information is then sent to the secretary of state's office, which checks for duplicates. The updated information is then sent back to the counties. In other states, the election office checks for duplicates within each county.

Election day registration is like any other registration. Once a voter has registered at the polls, he or she is added to the registration rolls. Unless the voter moves, the polling place registration will serve as a valid registration for the next election. This is not a provisional or temporary registration. In this respect, allowing people to vote at the polls may actually reduce the number of provisional ballots cast.

Registration at the polls would supplement other ways of registering to vote. If California adopted an EDR system, eligible citizens would still have the option of registering at the election office, at another government office (such as the department of motor vehicles), by mail, or via the Internet.


VOTERS LIKE ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION

In the states that currently have election day registration, the majority of voters clearly prefer registering at the polls to these other means of registration.

In states using election day registration, 10 to 20 percent of votes cast in each election are cast by people who register at the polls. Figure 1 shows the percentage of voters registering on election day in Minnesota and Idaho. Prior to 1994, Idaho did not use EDR. In 1994 and 1998, 10 percent of all general election voters in Idaho registered at the polls. In 1996 and 2000, 15 percent of people who voted in Idaho registered at the polls.

A similar pattern held in Minnesota from 1974 to 2000. Minnesota introduced election day registration in 1973. In the general elections of 1974, 1976, and 1980, more than 20 percent of those who voted in Minnesota registered at the polls. Since 1980, between 10 and 20 percent of all votes cast in Minnesota's general elections have come from people who registered on election day.

Figure 1: Election Day Registrants as a Percent of Votes Cast



Sources: Minnesota and Idaho Secretary of State Offices

Registering at the polls is, in fact, the main way that voters register in states with EDR. The 2000 Current Population Survey of the U.S. Census asked all people who have registered since 1995 how they registered; some of the resulting data are shown in Table 1. Fifty-five percent of registered voters in states with election day registration first registered at the polling place. Nineteen percent in EDR states registered at the local election office. Seventeen percent registered at departments of motor vehicles. Less than 2 percent registered by mail or through a registration drive. The remaining 9 percent signed up to vote at various other locations.

In states with only pre-election registration, people rely heavily on registration at departments of motor vehicles, registration by mail, and registration drives run by non-government organizations. Forty-one percent in states with pre-registration only register at departments of motor vehicles, probably the most convenient means of registering in these states. The second most common venue is the local election office, which registers 17 percent of new voters. In states without election day registration, mail-in registration and registration drives are much more common, accounting for a quarter of all new registrations.

Table 1: How People First Register in States Without EDR and States With EDR

	States Without EDR	California	States With EDR
Election Office	17.3%	5.2%	19.2%
Registry of Motor Vehicles	40.6	23.4	17.3
WIC Office	1.9	0.8	0.6
At Polling Place	2.2	1.7	54.9
Mail-in Registration	12.7	19.7	1.8
Registration Drive	12.2	30.5	1.8
At School or Hospital	6.6	6.2	2.9
Other	6.5	12.6	1.7

Source: Current Population Survey, U.S. Bureau of Census, 2000.

ELECTION OFFICIALS HAVE MORE CONTROL OVER REGISTRATION UNDER EDR

One striking feature of the figures in Table 1 is the degree to which election officials maintain some oversight or control over registration with election day registration. When we have interviewed election officials, they have said they prefer for people to register at the election office. They are frustrated that the procedures required by the NVRA have put components of voter registration into offices, like departments of motor vehicles, that do not wish to facilitate voter registration and are not equipped to answer people's questions. Election offices register as many new voters in EDR states as in non-EDR states. The big difference is that poll workers, who are trained and overseen by the election office, do the bulk of the registration.


In EDR states, fully 75 percent of all registrations are done under the supervision of the election office. This represents a significant improvement in the security and accuracy of the voter registration process. Security is enhanced because most voters are registering in person, with valid identification and under the supervision of an election official. Accuracy is enhanced, because most voter registrations are handled directly by election officials and are not being conducted by third parties.

A HISTORY OF VOTER REGISTRATION IN CALIFORNIA

Voter registration in California has changed significantly over the decades. The rules have not always been as stringent as they are today, and there have been times in the Golden State's history when there was essentially no voter registration. Throughout the 1850s and 1860s, for example, men declared their own eligibility to vote. As a result, there was a lot of concern about election fraud, and in many places, particularly San Francisco, armies of poll workers tried to ensure the validity of every election.

AN EARLY HISTORY OF VOTER REGISTRATION

In 1866, the California Registry Act was passed. This was the first time that voter registration was used in California. City clerks were to collect the names of all people who were eligible to vote. In order to be included, the potential voter had to show the city clerk proof of identification, which could include the voter being personal friends with the city clerk. Naturalized citizens had to prove their citizenship either by presenting their original court-sealed papers or by having two legal voters testify to their eligibility. Registration had to be completed three months before a general election in order for the person to be included in the register as an eligible voter.



In 1872 the Registry Act was revised in order to allow men to register during the three months prior to an election, and to lower the proof that immigrants had to provide in order to become registered. The act also instituted a new requirement: a voter who had relocated had to prove that his registration at his prior residence was canceled before he could register at his new residence. Six years later, there was a crackdown on voter registration law, targeting solely San Francisco. The goal was to “regulate the registration of voters, and to secure the purity of elections in the city and county of San Francisco” and to “rebuff the insurgent and anti-establishment Workingmen’s Party.” In essence, the new legislation gave control of San Francisco’s elections to a board of commissioners, which consisted of the mayor and four appointed county officials instead of the elected board of supervisors. There were a number of other changes as well, the most notable of which was the requirement that all voters re-register in person before every general election.

Throughout the Progressive Era, the registration laws were constantly revised. The requirements of naturalized citizens were loosened to the point that such people were no longer required to provide the sworn testimony of reg-

istered voters. Registration was also made easier for the more mobile citizens of the state by allowing the cancellation of previous registration and re-registration in the new location at the same time. The deadline to register was moved from 90 days to 40 days, registration paperwork was standardized, and the number of registration locations was increased. At the same time, however, some of the restrictions placed on San Francisco were implemented statewide. Included in this was compulsory biannual registration. This meant that all landlords were required to provide the registry with a list of their tenants. If a previously registered voter was not listed, he was given notice that he must appear before the registry within five days of receiving the notice. If he failed to do so, the voter’s name was removed from the registry.

From 1875 to 1905, electoral turnout dropped. In San Francisco, on average, 54 percent of adult males were registered. Scholars suggest that one-third, or possibly even more, of the national turnout decline could be explained by registration schemes not unlike those initially aimed at San Francisco in the late 1870s.

THE NATIONAL SCENE IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Switching to the national scene, in 1911 two important bills were passed: the Geran Act and the Corrupt Practices Act. The goal of the movement behind these bills, led by middle-class reformers, was to limit corruption and, more important, to decrease the electoral strength of immigrants and blacks—which they succeeded in doing. A registration system was created in every city with a population of more than 5,000 people, and in-person registration was now required and had to be renewed anytime a person moved or failed to vote in an election. In every election cycle, there were only four days during which citizens could register. In order to prove eligibility, a citizen had to identify himself acceptably and provide the register with his occupation; with the names of his parents, his spouse, and his landlord; and with a description of his current housing. It is clear how this would make it difficult for any highly mobile group to register, which at the time meant a virtual disenfranchisement of immigrants and blacks.

During most of the rest of the 20th century, California’s voter registration was largely determined by national legislation. In 1920, women were given the right to vote,⁴ and there were some fluctuations in voter registration as a result.⁵ An amendment to the Constitution was made in 1964, declaring poll taxes as a requirement to vote as unconstitutional.⁶ A year later the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed, which was little more than an effort to enforce the 15th amendment.⁷ In 1970, 18-year-

olds were given the right to vote (before then, only citizens 21 and older were allowed to participate in national elections).⁸ It was around this time that some states initiated election day registration systems. The most recent significant national change in voter registration legislation was the passage in 1993 of the National Voter Registration Act, which expanded the number of locations and opportunities for eligible citizens to register to vote, and which also established uniform voter registration file maintenance

procedures for the removal of ineligible people from voter registration lists.

Throughout the 20th century, California's registration deadline changed. For a significant period, the deadline was 30 days before the general election. In 1975 the deadline was moved to 29 days before the election. Most recently, effective January 1, 2001, the deadline to register or re-register to vote in California was shortened to 15 days prior to the election.


EDR AND VOTER PARTICIPATION

The main reason to adopt EDR is that it will increase voter turnout. Over the last 40 years, voting rates in California have fallen steadily, as shown in Figure 2.⁹ Here we graph voter registration and turnout in California as a percentage of the eligible voter population. In 1960, about 70 percent of Californians of voting age voted. By the 2000 election, that figure had fallen to 50 percent. The decline of voting in California tracks a nationwide decline in voting. Concern about falling participation motivated the passage of the National Voter Registration Act and many registration reforms at the state level.

Registration reform alone will not produce higher turnout. Figure 2 reveals that while voting rates have fallen 25 percent, registration rates have not declined in California. Instead, the number of names on the registration rolls has remained at about 70 to 80 percent of the voting-age population in the state. The discrepancy between trends in registration and turnout might reflect a growing number of registrations that are no longer valid or are duplicates. It may also reflect the fact that registration alone is not enough to spur people to vote. Studies of the connection between registration reforms and turnout suggest that the connection between registration and voting is not immediate.

Professor Michael Traugott of the University of Michigan recently surveyed the research on the effects of registration reforms, including closing dates for pre-election registration, mail-in registration, motor voter, and election day registration. Many of the reforms that have been tried have not produced substantial changes in participation. Election day registration is the exception.

Figure 2: California VAP Registration and Turnout



EDR WILL INCREASE VOTER PARTICIPATION IN CALIFORNIA

An extensive social science literature has examined the effects of election day registration on registration and participation rates. Allowing people to register at the polls produces a 3 to 6 percentage point increase in participation in the states that have adopted it.¹⁰

A simple comparison of states with EDR and states without EDR shows a substantial effect of

this reform on participation. Table 2 shows registration and voting rates in states that allow voters to register at the polls and states that do not.¹¹

Table 2: Registration and Turnout as Percentages in the 2000 General Election

	Registration	Turnout
EDR States^a	88.8%	65.6%
Non-EDR States^a	77.3%	50.5%
California^b	73.2%	51.9%
Nationwide^a	77.7%	51.3%

Sources:

^a Federal Election Commission, <http://www.fec.gov/pages/2000turnout/reg&to00.htm>. Registration percentages do not include Wisconsin and North Dakota, neither of which provide statewide registration counts.

^b California Secretary of State, http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2000_general/reg.pdf.

The table shows stunningly large differences in registration and voting rates between states that allow voters to register at the polls and states that do not. In states that allow voters to register at the polls, almost nine in ten people of voting age are registered; in states that do not have election day registration, only three-fourths of eligible voters are registered. Voting rates show an equally large difference. In states that have EDR, two out of every three voting-age people vote, compared with one out of every two voting-age people in other states.

Simply put, with EDR the rolls provide a more comprehensive list of the electorate and turnout is higher. A more extensive registration list is surely a means to an end. One benefit, though, is in the management of elections. Because registration at the polls produces a more complete list of the electorate than does pre-registration alone, election offices can more effectively communicate to the electorate as a whole the basic information about the election, including where to vote and when. Candidates, parties, and other organizations also use the registration lists to communicate with potential voters. As a result, election day registration may aid another democratic goal: a better-informed electorate.

One objection to the simple comparison in Table 2 is that the states that have election day registration may differ in systematic ways from states that do not. As a result, the association may be spurious. For example, the populations of states such as Minnesota and Wisconsin may be better educated or more interested in politics than the electorates

in other states, and education and interest in politics might explain much of the observed difference. In addition, the populations of these states have fewer people between the ages 18 to 25 than a state like California and fewer people who moved in the year before the election. The relative youth and mobility of California might account for its lower registration and turnout rate.

An extensive academic literature has examined whether the difference in participation associated with EDR can be attributed to the demographic composition, political circumstances, or culture of the individual states. The effect is real, though demographics explain some of the observed differences. In their seminal 1980 study of turnout, Professors Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone found that states with earlier registration closing dates (say, 60 days instead of 30 days) have significantly lower voter participation rates, controlling for the education, age, income, and other demographic features of the voters. A series of further studies has borne out this finding. These studies consistently find that states that move the registration closing day closer to election day or that shift to election day registration achieve notable increases in their long-term levels of voter turnout. Election day registration itself is associated with increasing participation rates by 3 to 6 percentage points of the voting-age population.¹² In his survey of this research, Professor Michael Traugott concludes that election day registration is one of the few registration reforms that has produced real long-term increases in participation rates.

Election day registration works because it plays into the dynamic of campaigns and elections, which build up to election day. As election day approaches, more people become interested in voting and therefore more people wish to register. Consistent with this explanation, changing the closing date for pre-election registration significantly affects turnout. In addition, election day registration makes get-out-the-vote activities much easier. Campaigns and other organizations need to run only one grass-roots campaign: getting people to the right polling places on election day. This reform reduces the need to run voter registration drives.

The consensus among the academic studies, then, is that election day registration produces a lasting increase in the turnout rate of 3 to 6 percentage points of the voting age population in Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. A similar increase in participation in California would have meant that between 640,000 and 1.2 million additional Californians would have cast votes in the 2000 election.

CALIFORNIA MIGHT SEE BIGGER INCREASES IN TURNOUT THAN OTHER STATES

We think that the potential effect on voting in California may be much larger. The reason has to do with the demographics of California and with election day registration. In states that have adopted EDR, the largest increases in participation rates have occurred for two groups: 18-to-25-year-olds and those who have moved in the six months before the election.

Among 18-to-25-year-olds, voter turnout is 12 percentage points higher in states with EDR than it is in states without EDR. Among older cohorts, voter turnout is 8 percentage points higher in states with EDR than in states without EDR. EDR, then, could make a significant improvement in the civic participation of young people.

Mobility shows a similar effect. Among those who moved within the prior six months, voter turnout was 13 percentage points higher in states with EDR than it was in other states. Among those who had been in their current residence at least six months, voter turnout was 7 percentage points higher in EDR states than it was in other states.

Adjusting for the effects of age, mobility, and many other factors reveals that California could see its long-run turnout rate increase by as much as 9.2 percent in presidential elections. This means that turnout in the 2000 presidential election in California could have been as high as 61.6 percent if EDR had been in place.¹³

We view this as an upper bound for the potential increase in participation. The implication of this analysis is enormous. Had EDR been in place in 2000, as many as 1.9 million more Californians might have voted.

GROUPS NOW WITH LOW TURNOUT WILL SEE THE HIGHEST INCREASE UNDER EDR

Furthermore, our statistical analysis shows that under EDR there would be sizable increases in participation by some of the groups that now have low rates of voter turnout in California. The statistical analysis uses individual level data from the 1998 and 2000 Current Population Survey's Voter Supplement file, collected by the Bureau of the Census, to which we append data on each state's voter registration systems. We then use a statistical model that estimates the propensity that every eligible citizen turns out to vote in each election; using this statistical model we produce a simulation predicting the probability that California's eligible citizens would turn out if California adopted EDR.

This analysis, details of which are reported in the technical appendix to this report, finds:

- A 12.5 percent increase in turnout by 18-to-25-year-olds.
- A 10.3 percent increase in turnout by those with a grade school education or less.
- An 11 percent increase in turnout by Latinos and a 7.1 percent increase by African Americans.
- A 10.4 percent increase in turnout by those who have lived at their current address for less than six months.

Our statistical analysis shows that under EDR there would be sizable increases in participation by some of the groups that now have low rates of voter turnout in California.

- A 12.2 percent increase in turnout by naturalized citizens.

From these estimates, it is clear that EDR in California would strongly affect groups who are currently considered to be low-propensity voters.


A separate question is whether the partisan composition of the voting public would change substantially if California allows registration at the polls. The answer appears to be no. Professors Raymond Wolfinger of the University of California at Berkeley and Ben Highton of the University of California at Davis have studied this question extensively. Although nonvoters and voters differ politically, adoption of election day registration and changes in the closing date for pre-registration have produced only slight changes in the party division of the vote in states that have adopted those changes.¹⁴

To some, this prediction is surprising. Many people believe that EDR tends to benefit the Democratic Party. However, what is relevant is who is affected by EDR. EDR evidently has its biggest effects among people who have partisan preferences similar to those of people who already vote. As a result, we expect little change in the partisan division of the electorate, but we expect many more people to vote in California if the state adopts election day registration.

FRAUD IS A CONCERN UNDER EDR

Voter fraud sounds like the stuff of party bosses and political machines, but it occurs today. From 1994 to 2001, 58 cases of election fraud were prosecuted in the state of California, with 32 of these cases involving some form of fraudulent voter registration.¹⁵ Instances of fraud where the illegal votes were decisive have been relatively rare.¹⁶

Voter fraud is a persistent concern of those who run elections. Fraud is hard to detect and to measure. It may involve only enough ballots to win an election, and there may be no paper trail that would allow election officials to determine what exactly occurred. If officials determine that fraudulent ballots put the outcome of an election in doubt, then a new election must be held.



And fraud is the main objection to election day registration. If all a person has to do to vote is go to the polls, then it is easy to imagine how people might commit fraud. A person may go to many different polling places and vote, or a person may go to the same polling place several times throughout the day. Indeed, chronic, organized voter

fraud in the 19th century gave rise to the voter registration procedures we use today.

REAL FRAUD IN EDR STATES IS HARD TO FIND

States with EDR report few problems with fraud. For example, following the 2000 general election in Wisconsin, allegations of significant voter fraud surfaced in Milwaukee. Two cases reported in the national press stood out. A student at Marquette University told ABC News that he had registered using under his own name and voted four times on election day; a student survey found that 174 students claimed to have voted more than once. A second instance involved a Democratic campaign operative who allegedly offered cigarettes to homeless people in exchange for their votes. These scandals broke as the controversy over the presidential vote threatened to have a recount of the vote in Wisconsin, as well as in Florida.¹⁷

Both sets of allegations prompted immediate investigations by the Milwaukee County Attorney's Office. In the first case, the county attorney inspected the registration lists, voter lists, and ballots in the precincts in question. After what the attorney's office said were "hundreds of hours" of investigation, no cases of fraudulent voting were found at the precincts at Marquette University. The student who claimed to have voted four times using his own name each time had in fact voted exactly once. Inspection of the

other names on the registration and voter rolls turned up no duplicates, and validation of the names on the lists turned up no illegal voters. Weeks after the story broke on ABC News, the student who reported the story publicly recanted. He stated that he had invented the story to bring attention to the fact that voter fraud *could* occur, not that it had. The county attorney's investigation did find that the student in question had been selling fake identification cards. He was convicted.¹⁸

The second case was real. A Democratic Party activist from New York came to Milwaukee to campaign. She offered cigarettes to homeless people if they would vote. Interestingly enough, this proved to be something of the exception that proves the rule. The case involved absentee ballots, *not* polling place registration.¹⁹

Apart from these cases, the Milwaukee County Attorney's Office did find evidence of voter fraud involving election day registration in two cases in 2000. Both cases involved individuals who were felons on parole and who voted even though they were not allowed to under state law. The prosecutions were unsuccessful, because the parole boards failed to inform the individuals that they were not permitted to vote until the duration of their sentences had been served.

According to the Milwaukee County and city election offices, the number of allegations of fraud in 2000 was unusual. The City and County of Milwaukee typically have one or two cases each election.²⁰

We also interviewed Minneapolis's county election offices in Hennepin County (which includes Minneapolis and its suburbs and administers elections for all but Minneapolis), and Ramsey County (which includes St. Paul). Like Milwaukee, the Twin Cities and their surrounding counties experience a couple of cases of voter fraud, involving only one or two votes, in each election. As one election official put it, "We just don't have a problem with vote fraud."²¹ The number of cases of fraud in Minneapolis-St. Paul and Milwaukee certainly do not exceed the instances of fraud currently in California, which are few.

FRAUD CAN BE PREVENTED THROUGH ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

The low levels of vote fraud detected in Minneapolis-St. Paul and Milwaukee are, in part, a product of the hard work of the election administrators. The election offices actively work to keep people from mistakenly voting incorrectly.

Fraud is also heavily punished and actively policed in these counties. Renee Coffee of the Ramsey County Election Office in St. Paul put it bluntly: "There's minimal to no fraud. . . . It's a felony. It's just not worth it. There's a minimum fine of \$10,000 or one to two years in prison."²²

Both states require that people registering at the polls produce current identification or sign a legally binding affidavit, countersigned by someone who is registered to vote in the precinct and who vouches for the residency of the new registrant. The states impose heavy penalties for vote fraud, and the penalties are posted at the polling places. Polling place workers receive a two-hour training course on how to register voters on election day.

Minnesota went a step further than Wisconsin. Anticipating potential problems, the state's registration law requires county attorneys to give immediate attention to all allegations of voter fraud. As one election official in Hennepin County stated, "We get really good service from the county attorneys."²³

After the election the counties must record and validate all of the new registrations within 30 days. The counties check for duplicate registrations or registrations that happened at the wrong polling place.

The states distinguish voter fraud from erroneous registrations. Erroneous registrations can occur if the poll worker is not attentive to where the person should register or if the voter simply insists on registering. All incorrect registrations are first assumed to be errors. Of course, some might be cases of intentional voter fraud. Anyone who registers in the wrong place is sent a warning card and informed of the penalties if they do so a second time.

Minnesota also has computerized registration information, which is processed at the state level. All counties use the same computer system for recording their registrations. Once the new registrations are entered on the computer system, they are sent to the secretary of state's office. The secretary of state pools the county data and produces a list of duplicate and potentially incorrect registrations. This list is then sent to the counties. The counties then try to resolve the problems. In the large majority of cases, perhaps 90 percent of the time, the problematic registrations detected by the secretary of state's office occurred because of typographical errors.²⁴

According to the Minneapolis election office, less than 1 percent of all people who register at the polls register at the wrong place or incorrectly. According to the Ramsey County election office, only five to ten people definitely registered to vote at the wrong polling place in the most recent city elections.²⁵

This was not always the case. Professor Richard Smolka of American University conducted a study of election day registration in the 1974 and 1976 elections in Minneapolis and in Bloomington, Minnesota, which is also in Hennepin

County. The cities' reports showed that in the 1974 and 1976 elections a very high fraction, ranging from 25 to 40 percent, of people who registered on election day registered at the wrong polling place. This might reflect some fraud. More likely it arose because of the confusion associated with a new way of conducting registration. Eventually, it appears, Minneapolis got this problem under control.

They did so through three procedures.

First, as discussed above, they sent warning letters to all people who registered improperly.

Second, they provided poll workers with a complete list of all street addresses within their precincts and with a book of all addresses and the appropriate polling places in the

It is clear that safeguards against fraudulent and erroneous registrations will be necessary with election day registration. However, the experiences of several cities demonstrate that problems of fraud can be minimized through the administration of the registration system.

city. Milwaukee provides each polling place with a detailed city map showing the precinct boundaries and polling place locations. Poll workers and voters can check where the voters are supposed to vote.

Third, city and county election offices stepped up communication with the voters. Registered voters are sent cards with their polling place locations. This has worked because the cities' and counties' registration lists have become more complete over time.

REGISTRATION FRAUD MAY BE MORE DIFFICULT UNDER EDR

Fraud is a persistent concern with any election system. Fraud, at a very low level, apparently occurs with the registration and absentee voting systems in place today, as the Compton mayoral election attests. It is clear that safeguards against fraudulent and erroneous registrations will be necessary with election day registration. However, the experiences of Milwaukee, Minneapolis, and St. Paul show that problems of fraud can be minimized through the administration of the registration system.

EDR may even offer counties an opportunity to strengthen their fraud prevention. Under the National Voter Registration Act, election offices have come to have less control and supervision of voter registration. As shown in Table 1 above, most registrations are not under the control of the election office. Applications for registration come to the election office from departments of motor

vehicles and through registration drives and the mail. Registrations through these means may be much more susceptible to fraud and error than registration at the polling place. Registration at the polling place requires citizens to provide some form of identification. Registration through the mail or at departments of motor vehicles, or through a registration drive, often does not.

Because EDR requires voter identification and authentication in person, it actually makes voter registration fraud

more difficult than a voter registration system that only requires a signature on a mailed-in form. Most voter registrations in EDR states come through the EDR system, so voter registration is under the supervision of election officials. Coupled with increased penalties for voter fraud and sound administration procedures, EDR in California should make voter registration fraud more difficult to undertake than under the voter registration system currently in place in the state.

MAKING EDR WORK: THE IMPORTANCE OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

EDR will change the management of the elections. There will be an increase in the number of people served by the system: More will register and more will vote. Counties and cities must prepare for that change. To prevent fraud and voting in the wrong location, counties will have to put in place new administrative procedures and change the operation of polling places.

Management problems are difficult but not insurmountable. One concern expressed to us by several administrators is that registration at the polling places will produce long lines and lead to worse service for voters on election day. Such problems may actually discourage some people from voting.

UNDER EDR, VOTER SERVICE AT POLLS MAY IMPROVE IN CALIFORNIA

In fact, voters may get better service at polling places in states that allow voters to register at the polls. It is hard to find metrics of polling place “service,” such as lengths of lines or complaints. One metric is whether polling place operations and registration discourage people from voting. The U.S. Census tries to measure exactly this.

The Current Population Survey of the U.S. Census asks all registered voters who did not vote why they did not vote. In states with election day registration, registered nonvoters reported substantially fewer difficulties when they tried to vote. In states without election day registration, 7.4 percent stated that they did not vote because of a problem with their registration, and this was a poll of registered voters.²⁶ In states with EDR, only 1.1 percent of registered nonvoters stated that they could not vote because of problems with registration. Decreasing the number of registered people who could not vote because of registration problems from 7.4 percent to 1.1 percent in 2000 would have produced 2.5 million more votes nationwide in 2000. In California, this corresponds to more than 300,000 more people voting in 2000.²⁷

A second metric of service is the number of people reporting that they couldn’t vote because of long lines at polling places or because of problems with polling place locations. In states without election day registration, 2.8 percent of registered voters who did not vote reported that the main reason they did not vote was polling place problems—long lines, inconvenient locations, or short hours at polling places. In states with EDR, a smaller fraction of registered nonvoters—just 1.8 percent—reported that polling place problems prevented them from voting.

This is surely a very small difference, but it is revealing. The states with EDR are able to handle the higher volume of voters on election day without discouragingly long lines or other polling place problems. In fact, the incidence of people discouraged from voting by long lines or polling place locations appears to be lower in states that allow people to register at the polls.

One reason that service at the polling places won’t deteriorate, and might improve, is that registration at the polls eliminates some common and time-consuming problems that arise with the current administrative procedures. Interviews with county officials indicate that they receive many late registration applications that were filled out in advance of election day by citizens but were not filed by the person running a registration drive or were not sent from the county office where the registration was filed. Such problems create headaches for poll workers and county officials and can disenfranchise voters. They also create backlogs at the polling places and county offices, because the poll workers must resolve these questions at the polling place, often using their own discretion.



Consider the following situation: A person arrives at the polling place believing that he or she is registered, but the person's name is not on the registration list at the polling place. The person registered correctly at the department of motor vehicles when pre-election registration was open, but the polling place list does not contain the person's registration, because the registration application arrived at the county election office too late to be entered on the lists used at polling places on election day.²⁸ Should the voter be allowed to vote? To resolve this question, the poll worker must contact the county election office to verify the registration. That means that the poll worker must stop doing other activities and wait on the phone for the county election office to look up the person's registration at the central office. Often the poll worker is put on hold because the election office has many such questions to deal with throughout the day. It is certainly more efficient to register the person at the polls and allow them to vote.

WHAT PROBLEMS MIGHT EDR PRODUCE IN POLLING PLACES?

EDR can produce backlogs at the polls. There are two specific problems.

First, it takes time to register someone. The poll worker must authenticate the voter, look up the address to make sure the voter is in the correct polling place, and fill out the registration card. The EDR states deal with potential backlogs by having separate voter check-in for those who are already registered and for those who are registering at the polls that day. Those who register at the polls will still have to wait in line.

Second, some voters come to the wrong polling place. The poll workers must look up the correct polling place for each new voter and instruct those who are in the wrong place where they are permitted to vote. This might be accomplished by posting a street map that shows the locations of all polling places in an area at the entrance to each polling place. Some municipalities assign this task to a poll worker.

Implementation of EDR in California will require that the counties recruit more poll workers or change the structure of polling places by increasing precinct sizes. In a typical precinct in Minneapolis, two poll workers check in voters who are pre-registered, and two to three poll workers handle the election day registrations and instruct voters about polling place locations. Minneapolis requires a minimum of four poll workers per polling place. In larger precincts and those with a large number of election day registrants, such as at universities, additional poll workers are used.

How many additional poll workers might California counties need? In the 2000 election, two-thirds of the voting-age population in Minneapolis voted and nearly 20 percent of the voters registered at the polling places. The typical polling place in Minneapolis has six workers, and there are 145 polling places in the city. That works out to one poll worker for every 200 voters. That is slightly more staffing than Los Angeles County currently uses at its polling places. The typical precinct in Los Angeles County has 800 voters and four poll workers. These figures suggest that a county like Los Angeles might have to increase its poll worker staff by about 15 percent to handle the increased number of voters. That works out to about half a person per precinct. A more conservative estimate is one additional poll worker per precinct, or about a 25 percent increase in the number of poll workers.

This is not a trivial requirement, as recruiting poll workers is currently a difficult task. As one county administrator stated, "We can't find enough poll workers now." It currently costs approximately \$65 per person to recruit polling place workers in Los Angeles County. The county trains these poll workers, holding 400 training classes in 65 cities

The states with EDR are able to handle the higher volume of voters on election day without discouragingly long lines or other polling place problems.

throughout the county before a major countywide election.²⁹ Recruiting and training additional polling place workers will require a commitment of more time and resources by election administrators statewide.

A further problem expressed to us by election administrators is that registration at the polls might further erode the ability of county election offices to oversee registration. The lack of central control and oversight is a real concern. Simple problems with registration applications, such as a late application or the absence of a signature on an application, can be solved with more oversight by the central office and more training of the people handling voter registrations at other government offices or on registration drives.

Those problems are inherent to existing systems for registration. Currently, about one in six people nationwide register at the county office. In California, only one in 20 register at the county election office. As the figures in Table 1 above reveal, only about 30 percent of Californians register at a government office, with the lion's share applying to register at the department of motor vehi-

cles. Well over half of all registrations in California come through registration drives and mail-in registrations.

The experience in states with election day registration is that registration at the polls replaces a large fraction of registrations through mail or drives and registrations at other government offices. The polling place is not the county election office, but is supervised by the county office. The county election office is responsible for training poll workers. With EDR, then, there is the prospect of registration being done better and by people who have been trained how to register voters in accordance with the law.

THE BIGGEST ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM: GETTING PEOPLE TO THE RIGHT POLLING PLACES

The main administrative problem we foresee with EDR is making sure that new voters get to the right polling places. Election officials in Minneapolis and Milwaukee say this is one of their biggest challenges. As mentioned above, the first few elections Minneapolis held with EDR were marred by confusion about where new registrants were supposed to vote. According to a study by Professor Richard Smolka, many polling place registrations in Minneapolis and Bloomington, Minnesota, in 1976 were deemed faulty. Forty percent of election day registrations in Minneapolis were deemed faulty in 1975 and 1976. In Bloomington, which provided the most detailed information, a total of 464—or 6 percent—of the registrations were faulty. A majority of the faulty registrations involved errors in the recording of the registrations by the poll workers, but a significant fraction also involved people voting in the wrong place. Of the faulty registrations in Bloomington in 1976, 198 recorded no driver's license address and 151 voted in the wrong precinct.³⁰

The counties in Minnesota have reduced these faulty registrations to a trivial amount by:

- (1) Training poll workers how to register people at the polls.
- (2) Providing each polling place with detailed information about where people residing at each address are supposed to vote.
- (3) Posting the penalties for voting in the wrong place, which is a felony.
- (4) Sending warning letters to all people who have faulty polling place registrations.

Today, Minneapolis reports that less than 1 percent of its polling place registrations are faulty. That improvement has come with considerable effort by the county and city election offices.

POTENTIAL COSTS TO ELECTION ADMINISTRATORS UNDER EDR

Election day registration will create new expenses for county election offices. Information provided by registrars of Fresno County, Humboldt County, and Los Angeles County indicates that county election offices will need additional staff and information technology. Counties will need to hire additional poll workers to handle registration at the polling places and temporary office staff to process those registrations after election day. New office computers and software will be required to process polling place registration information in a timely way.³¹

In addition, the number of different languages that must be supported will surely affect the cost of implementing EDR. California has a large population of non-English speakers. Polling places may need to have registration materials in different languages and additional poll workers to register people of different languages. It is unclear how much additional staffing and support materials will be needed beyond what is already required in precincts with large numbers of non-English speakers.


A complete analysis of the cost burden to the counties is further complicated because new costs may be offset partly by savings on other items. For example, counties will have many fewer pre-election registrations to process and less mail to handle, easing pre-election staffing requirements.

EDR SHOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE COST OF ELECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA

Comparison of per-capita election administration expenditures (for all activities) in California and in Minnesota and Wisconsin shows little difference in overall costs.

In 2000, Los Angeles County spent approximately \$3.80 for every person of voting age in the county. The same year, Orange County spent \$3.06 for every person of voting age. The City of San Francisco spent approximately \$10 for every person of voting age in 1999–2000.³²

Minneapolis and Milwaukee, the two largest cities currently using EDR, spend approximately the same amount as Los Angeles and Orange Counties per capita to run elections. In the 2000 election, Minneapolis spent \$3.30 per person of voting age and Milwaukee spent \$3.65 per person of voting age.³³ Importantly, the costs cited by Minneapolis and Milwaukee already include the additional staffing and technology needed to implement EDR.



One concern about the comparison of Minneapolis and Milwaukee with some of the larger California counties is whether the per-capita costs of administering elections grow exponentially with the size of a place. Minneapolis and Milwaukee are comparable in size to cities like San Francisco and San Diego but are much smaller than the city of Los Angeles or its counties. Might it be disproportionately more expensive to implement EDR in large counties? We suspect not. Election administration generally shows returns to scale. Smaller counties and municipalities have higher per-capita election administration costs than larger counties and municipalities. This holds true nationwide, and it is true in the states using EDR, too.³⁴

WHY WE FAVOR EDR

For voters, election day registration holds enormous promise. It is a simpler way to vote. It will lessen many of the problems that voters currently experience at the polling places. People like one-step voting. With EDR, more people register and more people vote. In California, EDR will likely produce substantially higher voter turnout.

There are some potential problems with EDR. Fraud is a persistent concern. It is easy to imagine how one might commit voting fraud with polling place registration. However, fraud appears to be minimal in states using EDR. The states using EDR have experienced minimal fraud because they have put in place carefully thought out mechanisms for detecting and discouraging fraud.

The most serious practical and real difficulty with EDR is getting people to vote in the right places. Minneapolis initially had a problem with this, but has since solved the problem. Getting people to the right polling places will require that the counties recruit additional poll workers and communicate to current and potential voters where they should vote.

A central feature of EDR in Minnesota is the computerized statewide registration database. California should develop a computerized voter registration system to facilitate the registration process anyway, but especially if EDR is approved. By no means is such a system critical for the success of EDR, but it would make it much easier to detect improper registrations and other problems. Creating such a system is technically challenging, especially for a state the size of California. But computerized registration systems

The bottom line on costs is that we expect no substantial increase in election administration costs over the long run. Per-capita election administration expenditures in Minneapolis and Milwaukee are nearly the same today as in the California counties. There may be a short-run increase in spending required as the counties figure out how to implement EDR; voters should be prepared to pay for what is needed.³⁵ But over the long run, we expect no substantial difference in overall election administration expenditures, on a per-capita basis. With approximately the same cost per capita as California counties spend today, California could sustain even higher voter participation.

have been effectively implemented in many states, Michigan being the largest.³⁶

EDR apparently does not make election administration more expensive. Total per-capita election administration expenditures in Minneapolis and Milwaukee are on par with per-capita expenditures in California counties—about \$3.50 per voting-age person. And these costs include additional poll workers and computerization of registration.

Our judgment about whether EDR makes sense for California depends on the value of increased participation relative to the potential problems of fraud and faulty regis-

The choice for election day registration is clear. EDR will lower barriers to voting and significantly increase participation in California elections.

tration. The experiences in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and elsewhere suggest that participation will increase substantially, while problems of fraud and faulty registration will be minimal. The end result will be higher participation, without an erosion of the integrity of the process.

If the goal of election administration is to make it easy to vote in fair and clean elections, then the choice for election day registration is clear. EDR will lower barriers to voting and significantly increase participation in California elections—anywhere from 3 percentage points to as much as 9 percentage points. In a state with 25 million eligible voters, that amounts to an increase in participation of 600,000 to 1.2 million voters in major statewide elections.

To estimate the impact of EDR in California, we performed statistical analyses on the reported voting behavior of people who responded to surveys conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau in 1998 and 2000. In doing so, we examine registration and turnout among eligible voters across the United States, controlling for individual characteristics as well as for state characteristics—most important, the implementation of EDR in the six states listed above. We do this with the Current Population Survey (CPS) Voter Supplement data collected by the Bureau of the Census at the time of the general elections in 1998 and 2000. While we conducted our analysis of both the 1998 and 2000 elections, we utilize only the 2000 data in the body of this report.³⁷ The 1998 analysis confirms the conclusions reported in the text for the 2000 election.

The CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The survey has been conducted for more than 50 years. In each even-numbered year since 1964, the November Current Population Survey has included questions about registration and turnout. The sheer size of this data collection makes it particularly well suited for our analysis. Unlike the NES and GSS collections, the CPS survey is administered to a large sample of citizens in each of the 50 U.S. states. This enables it to yield very accurate estimates of the influence of both individual and state institutional factors on voting behavior.

A long literature in political science on voting and turnout, extending back to the 1940s, demonstrates that voting and turnout are strongly correlated with demographic variables—particularly age, education, and income.³⁸ Common theories of voting behavior suggest that these variables affect the costs an individual incurs in finding out about political issues and the candidates running for office, as well as the mechanical hurdles associated with voting, such as the registration deadline and the location of polling places. For this reason, we include the following individual-specific variables in our analysis: age, education, race, gender, marital status, family income, home ownership,³⁹ whether or not one is a native-born U.S. citizen,⁴⁰ and length of time at current address.

Four factors—the person’s age, education, race, and income—are coded categorically. The respondent’s age is measured using five dummy variables denoting an age of 18

to 25 years, 26 to 35 years, 36 to 45 years, 46 to 60 years, or 61 to 75 years. The respondent’s education is measured with three variables indicating that he or she has some grade school or high school education, a high school degree, or some college education (a B.A. degree is the omitted category). The race of the respondent is measured by three dummy variables denoting whether or not he or she self-identifies as white, black, or Hispanic. Lastly, the respondent’s family income is categorized by three variables demarcating an income of \$0–20,000 per year, \$20,000–40,000 per year, or \$40,000–60,000 per year (\$60,000 and up is the omitted category). Gender, marital status, home ownership, whether or not one is a native-born citizen, and length of time at current address are each measured by simple dummy variables. If each of these variables takes on a value of 1, the respondent is male, married, a native-born U.S. citizen, and a homeowner with less than six months at his or her current address. A value of zero for any of these variables denotes otherwise for the feature to which the variable pertains.

With this data of individual-specific characteristics we merge relevant contextual information from the Council of State Governments (1998–99, 2000–01)⁴¹ using state codes included by the CPS. Three of these variables are determined by state electoral practices: whether or not the state has a voter registration system⁴²; the number of days the registration deadline occurs before the election; and whether or not the state has election day registration. Three other variables are determined by the competitiveness in the relevant state of the year’s gubernatorial and Senate races, as well as the competitiveness of the presidential race in the state in 2000. For each of these races we produce a dummy variable that is coded a 1 when the result of the designated race was determined by a margin of 5 percent or less of the total number of votes.

An important feature of EDR is its potential to increase turnout and registration more strongly among those who face high costs of voting and are therefore traditionally less likely to turn out to vote. To test for such effects, we include in our analysis interactions between the dummy variable indicating EDR and the variables measuring the respondent’s age, education, family income, whether or not the respondent is native born, and the length of time

the respondent has lived at his or her current address. We do not include interactions of EDR with every individual-level variable included in the analysis, because many are statistically insignificantly related to registration and turnout and when included demand such a multitude of coefficients that estimation is difficult.

Our purpose with this analysis is to explain two things: voter registration and voter turnout. As dependent variables, each of these is binary. A registration value of 1 indicates being registered to vote and a turnout value of 1 indicates having turned out to vote, whereas zeros for each variable indicate the opposite. Traditionally, a simple binary logit model is appropriate for this type of analysis. However, because we are especially interested in the differing effects of state institutions on turnout and registration, we wish to control for the random disturbances that may be unique to each of the 50 U.S. states. We do this with a random-effects logit model. We estimate four such random-effects logit models: one predicting voter registration and another predicting turnout for each of the general elections in 1998 and 2000.

All of the variables—with the exception only of some of the interaction specifications—are significantly related to turnout. The influence of these factors substantiates our hypothesis of their role in determining the individual's cost of voting and supports similar descriptions by past studies of voting in the political science literature.

It is important to recognize the implications of the non-linear relationship between the individual's estimated utility for the dependent variable action (registering or voting) and the probability that he or she will take that action. This nonlinearity means that the magnitude of the impact of an independent variable on the likelihood that an individual registers or votes can be better understood by calculating the change in the predicted probabilities due to shifts in the independent variable rather than by simply looking at tables of estimated coefficients. This is especially true for understanding the effects of interactions like those between EDR and the cost variables. The nonlinearities of probit and logit models essentially formulate an unmeasured interactive specification among the independent variables.⁴³ For this reason, the predicted coefficients for the interaction variables tell us little about their true impact on the individual's likely action. It is

only by calculating the change in the probabilities of an individual voting or registering under counterfactual scenarios that we may understand the impact of a variable on the individual's behavior.

Given this, we evaluate the effect of EDR on registration and voting by simulating the change it would bring about in the individual's predicted probabilities of taking either action. As this study is concerned primarily with the effect of this change in the state of California, we do this exercise only for CPS respondents living in California as the time they were surveyed. We first calculate the predicted probabilities that each Californian registered and voted. We then set the values of the EDR variables to be what they would be if California implemented EDR and adjust the EDR interactions accordingly, and then recalculate the predicted probabilities that each Californian registered and voted. Averaging across California respondents for each of these two sets of predicted probabilities and taking the difference between them gives us an estimate of the increase in the aggregate rates of registration and turnout in California under EDR.

Voter registration and voter turnout in California are expected to increase dramatically under EDR. In 1998, voter registration would have increased by an estimated 5.7 percentage points (meaning 1,083,907 new registered voters) and voter turnout would have increased by an estimated 4.4 percentage points (meaning 836,701 additional voters) among the eligible voting age population. In 2000, voter registration would have increased by an estimated 3.3 percentage points (meaning 654,636 new registered voters) and voter turnout would have increased by an estimated 9.2 percentage points (meaning 1,825,045 additional voters), again among the eligible voting-age population.

Perhaps more important than these overall increases in registration and turnout are the expected relative increases among those who are traditionally least likely to vote. Turnout among those who are younger, less educated, less wealthy, and part of a minority group is likely to increase by more than turnout among other groups of eligible voters. This would serve to make the voting population much more representative of the general population. Thus, under EDR the differences between voters and nonvoters would greatly diminish, helping to ensure adequate representation of all constituents' political interests.

- 1 The historical literature on voter registration finds two rationales for the development of voter registration systems: prevention of voter fraud and limiting the electoral franchise. Alexander Keyssar's recent book *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States* (New York: Basic Books, 2000) examines the origins of voter registration laws closely. Keyssar concludes: "The examples of New Jersey, Illinois, and California suggest the significance of the fine print in the extremely lengthy and detailed registration statutes adopted by most states from the time of the Civil War through the aftermath of World War I. Nearly everywhere, such laws emerged from a convergence of partisan interest with sincere concern about electoral fraud; the extent to which they prevented honest men from voting varied over time and from state to state" (page 156). Also see Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward's *Why Americans Don't Vote* (New York: Pantheon, 1989) for a different interpretation of the historical rationale for voter registration systems, one focusing less on prevention of voter fraud and more on limitations on the franchise.
- 2 Fortunately, California allows for provisional ballots to protect against such cases, and many voters seem unaware of this option.
- 3 Most registered voters in California use the sample ballots that are mailed to them routinely before an upcoming election to figure out where and when to vote, as well as to learn about the candidates and ballot measures on the ballot. The question is how to ensure that nonregistered citizens who want to go to the polls to register and then vote can be directed to the correct polling place; since these people's names and addresses will not be on voter registration rolls, local election officials will have to resort of other procedures to contact these citizens.
- 4 19th Amendment: The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
- 5 For a complete table of California voter registration and turnout from 1910 to 2000, see the appendix.
- 6 24th Amendment: The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representatives in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
- 7 15th Amendment: The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
- 8 26th Amendment: The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.
- 9 The data for Figure 2 come from the California Secretary of State's Statement of Vote for the November 2000 election; http://ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2000_general/reg.pdf. The Secretary of State's office estimates the eligible electorate as the total adult population over 18, excluding noncitizens, felons in prison and on parole, and citizens who have been deemed mentally incompetent by a court order.
- 10 A series of important academic studies examining registration requirements and voter turnout: C.L. Brians, "Voter Registration Laws and Turnout in America: The Last Two Decades," Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Irvine, 1997; C.L. Brians and B. Grofman, "When Registration Barriers Fall, Who Votes? An Empirical Test of a Rational Choice Model," *Public Choice* 99 (1999): 161–176; M.J. Fenster, "The Impact of Allowing Day of Registration Voting on Turnout in U.S. Elections from 1960 to 1992," *American Politics Quarterly* 22(1) (1994): 74–87; B. Highton, "Easy Registration and Voter Turnout," *The Journal of Politics* 59(2) (1997), 565–575; S. Knack, "Election-Day Registration: The Second Wave," *American Politics Quarterly* 29(1) (2001), 65–78; G.E. Mitchell and C. Wlezian, "The Impact of Legal Constraints on Voter Registration, Turnout, and the Composition of the American Electorate," *Political Behavior* 17(2) (1995), 179–202; S. Rhine, "Registration Reform and Turnout Change in the American States," *American Politics Quarterly* 23(4) (1995), 409–426; R.A. Teixeira, *The Disappearing American Voter* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1992); R.E. Wolfinger and S. J. Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); S.J. Rosenstone and J.M. Hansen, *Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America* (New York: Macmillan, 1993).
- 11 The Federal Election Commission (FEC) publishes a comprehensive database on state-level registration, turnout, and voting-age population. Except for data from California, we use the FEC's figures. The secretary of state's office in California offers its own calculation of the participation and registration rates, based on a slightly different "eligible electorate": citizens over 18 who are not incarcerated. According to the state, the eligible California electorate in November 2000 was 21,461,275. According to the FEC, only 44 percent of the voting-age population in California voted in 2000. The difficulty in calculating the eligible population is that the estimates of noncitizens and other ineligible vary widely. A February 2002 U.S. Census Bureau study, "Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2000" (<http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting.html>), reported estimates that 65.8 percent of the citizen voting-age population was registered in 2000 and that 57.9 percent of the citizen voting-age population participated in the 2000 elections. The Census Bureau data differ from figures produced by the secretary of state. Without a good estimate of the eligible population, we opt to use the conventional baseline, the voting-age population.

- 12 This is documented in the academic literature previously cited. See footnote 11. In a personal communication, Professor Ben Highton has suggested that the states that adopted EDR in the late 1990s (Idaho, New Hampshire, and Wyoming) have had less of an increase in participation than the states that adopted it in the 1970s (Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin). This is certainly borne out in the data on turnout in the Current Population Survey of the U.S. Census. People in the states that adopted EDR in the 1990s have turnout rates that are about 3 percentage points higher than one would expect given their demographics, while those in states that adopted EDR in the 1970s have turnout rates that are about 9 percentage points higher than expected. Specifically, a probit analysis—like that in the appendix predicting whether someone votes as a function of old EDR state, new EDR state, demographics, and metropolitan area—yields a prediction of old EDR states having a 10 percent higher rate of voting and new EDR states having a 3 percent higher rate of voting. The difference between old and new EDR states owes, in part, to the fact that it takes time for campaigns and administrators to adjust to EDR to make it work to its fullest potential and it takes time for voters to learn that there is one-step voting.
- 13 These estimates are based on our analysis of the 2000 Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS) Voter Supplement. Details of this analysis are provided in the technical appendix on analysis methodology.
- 14 See Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980, op cit; Highton, op cit; Rosenstone and Hansen, op cit.
- 15 This information was obtained from the California secretary of state’s Elections Fraud Investigations Unit (EFIU). Between 1994 and 2001 there were a total of 1,317 cases opened by the EFIU; 116 of these were referred to district attorneys and 58 led to prosecutions. The 26 other prosecuted cases during this period mainly involved falsified petitions (17), double voting (2), and other offenses (7).
- 16 The most recent case we know of in California where fraud was at issue in determining an election is *Bradley v. Compton*, Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, “Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law,” February 2, 2002, page 23. The June 5, 2001, general municipal election in Compton featured a number of very close races, most especially the mayoral race between Eric Perrodin and Omar Bradley. Perrodin won by a slim 261-vote margin out of the total 10,473 votes cast for one of the two candidates in that race. The court found that 144 illegal votes were cast, less than the margin of the election. The election was overturned because the city failed to properly randomize the order of names on the ballot.
- 17 Andrew Nieland, “In Milwaukee Activists Use New Tactics to Help Boost Voter Registration, Turnout,” *The Wall Street Journal* Interactive Edition, December 18, 2000 (<http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB977098086874819675.djm>). Nieland offers the following observation about EDR and fraud by Milwaukee mayor John Norquist: “To rig any significant number of ballots would just be an unimaginable pain in the butt.” Absentee voting, a staple of California voting, poses an equally big set of fraud challenges. Simpson, Glenn R., and Evan Perez, “Brokers’ Exploit Absentee Voters; Elderly are Top Targets for Fraud,” *The Wall Street Journal* Interactive Edition, December 19, 2000 (<http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB97718372846852342.djm>). There is the possibility that EDR will lower reliance on absentee ballots.
- 18 Phone interview by Stephen Ansolabehere with assistant county attorney Mike Mahoney, February 6, 2002. A series of articles in the *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel* covered the case. See David Doege, “No Evidence Found of Multiple Voting: McCann Concludes Students Mised Marquette Newspaper” (<http://www.jsonline.com/news/metro/dec00/vote21122000a.asp>).
- 19 Phone interview by Stephen Ansolabehere with assistant county attorney Mike Mahoney, February 6, 2002. “Cigarette Case Involves 15 to 25,” *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel* On Line, November 14, 2000 (<http://www.jsonline.com/news/metro/nov00/smokes15111400a.asp>).
- 20 Interview with Mike Mahoney, assistant attorney, Milwaukee County, February 6, 2002.
- 21 Phone interview with Patty Hansen, Hennepin County election official, January 31, 2002. That county turned over one case of voter registration fraud to the county attorney in 2000. Phone interview with Dani Connors-Smith, Minneapolis city election official, January 30, 2002. Phone interview with Renee Coffey, Ramsey County election official, February 6, 2002. That office sends one or two cases of fraud to the county attorney after each election. The cases usually involve confusion or a mistake, rather than intention to defraud the election.
- 22 Phone interview with Renee Coffey, February 6, 2002.
- 23 Phone interview with Patty Hansen, Hennepin County election official, January 31, 2002.
- 24 Of course, developing a computerized statewide voter registration system in California could facilitate implementation of EDR. However, a computerized statewide registration system is not a requirement for successful implementation of EDR in California, as long as other procedures are put into place to get prospective voters to the right polling places; voter identification requirements are established and followed; and strict penalties for fraud are in place.

- 25 Phone interview with Dani Connors-Smith, Minneapolis city election office, January 30, 2002. Phone interview with Renee Coffey, Ramsey County election official, February 6, 2002.
- 26 In California, an almost identical percent (7.5 percent) of registered nonvoters reported that they couldn't vote because of registration problems.
- 27 The VAP in California is approximately 28 million. Eighteen percent of those are registered nonvoters (about 5 million). Seven and a half percent of those report registration as the reason for not voting. Reducing that to 1.1 percent would amount to 320,000 additional voters.
- 28 Interviews with county officials in California and other states indicate that they receive many late registration applications that were filled out in advance of election day by the citizens, but were not filed by the person running a registration drive or were not sent from the county office where the registration was filed.
- 29 These statistics were provided in a meeting with Conny McCormack and her staff on January 25, 2002.
- 30 Richard Smolka, *Election Day Registration: The Minnesota and Wisconsin Experience in 1976* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977). See, especially, page 25.
- 31 Interviews with the staff of the Los Angeles County Registrar's office on January 25, 2002. E-mail correspondence with Humboldt County and Fresno County election officials on February 8, 2002. Humboldt County anticipates \$190,000 additional spending per election and a one-time expenditure of \$257,000.
- 32 Information on voting age population comes from the 2000 Census of Population and Housing (<http://www.census.gov>). Information on expenditures comes from county and city budget reports, all of which are posted on the Internet. San Francisco's data is posted at <http://www.sfgov.org/mayor/budget01/pdfs/031.pdf>; Orange County's is available from http://www.oc.ca.gov/ceo/finance/2002FN/p4_frm.htm. The San Francisco numbers are remarkably high. "The Mayor's Budget, 2001-2002," pages 161-164, reports expenditures of \$6.4 million and has a voting-age population of 664,107. Data from Los Angeles County is available at <http://regrec.co.la.ca.us/general/mediakit>.
- 33 Minneapolis has approximately 290,000 people of voting age, and the election division had a budget of \$921,000 in 2000. Milwaukee has approximately 426,000 people of voting age, and the election division had a budget of \$1,557,010 in 2000. Information on the election department budgets comes from the 2002 city budgets. Both budgets are available on the web. Minneapolis: <http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/citywork/city-coordinator/finance/services-budget/docs/adopted2002/Section8.pdf>. Milwaukee: <http://www.ci.mil.wi.us/citygov/doa/bmd/toc2.htm>.
- 34 *Voting: What Is, What Could Be*. Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, July 2001. Available at <http://www.vote.caltech.edu>.
- 35 Humboldt County, for example, anticipates \$275,000 in one-time costs. E-mail response of Lindsey McWilliams, the administrative services director of Humboldt County, to a survey of election administrators, February 8, 2002.
- 36 See *An Overdue Reform: The Need for Statewide Computerized Voter Registration Systems*, February 2002, <http://www.demos-usa.org/Pubs/Overdue>.
- 37 Using the 2000 CPS Voter Supplement, we estimate an eligible electorate of 19,837,454. This is lower than the secretary of state's eligible-electorate estimate of 21,461,275. These differences in estimates of the size of the eligible electorate in November 2000 do not affect any of our statistical methodology. In particular, these differences do not affect our estimates (discussed later in this appendix) of the percentage changes EDR will introduce in terms of overall voter turnout nor the differences in the electorate under EDR in California. The use of the CPS estimates is particularly important for our analysis when we estimate the numerical changes for subsets of the electorate under EDR—for example, how EDR might make it more likely that younger voters will turn out.
- 38 Lazarsfeld, P.F., Berelson, B., and Gaudet, H., *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944). Campbell, A., Converse, P.E., Miller, W.E., and Stokes, D.E., *The American Voter*. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964).
- 39 We are unable to include home ownership in the 2000 analysis because the CPS discontinued this variable in 2000.
- 40 The CPS did not ask noncitizens whether or not they voted, so we are not able to evaluate the relationship between EDR and voter fraud.
- 41 The Council of State Governments, 1998-99 and 2000-01. *The Book of the States* (Lexington, Kentucky: Council of State Governments).
- 42 This variable is coded a 1 for every state but North Dakota.
- 43 Nagler, J., 1991. "The Effect of Registration Laws and Education on U.S. Voter Turnout." *The American Political Science Review* 85:1393-1405.



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