Convenience Voting

VOTER CONFIDENCE IN CONTEXT AND THE EFFECT OF WINNING

gbain — Tue, 21 Oct 2008 12:10:16 -0700

A number of recent studies examine how confident voters are that their ballots are counted as
intended in U.S. federal elections from 2000 to 2004. One consistent finding of these studies is
that, relative to Democrats, Republican voters tend to be more confident that their ballots are
counted correctly. However, it is also the case that in terms of the national outcomes of the 2000
and 2004 elections, Republicans were victorious. Additionally, research suggests that in the
2004 election voters who cast a paper ballot are more confident relative to those who vote using
an electronic device. Although these results fit nicely into the 2000 and 2004 elections, we
hypothesize that future research of voter confidence should interpret voter confidence within the
context of the election. This hypothesis, and the particular context of the 2006 election, gives
rise to two testable hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that the effect of partisanship on voter
confidence is conditional on which party wins the election. Thus, we anticipate that, relative to
Republicans, Democrats will experience greater gains in confidence following the 2006 election.
Since the 2004 election, greater adoption of voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) devices
allows us to analyze the context of the technological debate regarding voting technology. The
second hypothesize we test is that voter access to a VVPAT device leads to higher rates of
confidence among electronic voters. Using a panel dataset containing self-reported confidence
levels before and after the 2006 election, we find empirical evidence that voter confidence is
influenced by the context of the election. First, we find a positive and significant winner's effect;
voter confidence is higher for individuals who voted for the winning candidate. Second, we find
that voters who cast ballots on an electronic voting machine with a VVPAT device exhibit higher
rates of confidence following the 2006 election when compared to electronic voters who do not
have access to VVPAT devices. Finally, in measuring the change in confidence rates before and
after the election we find no significant difference in the change in the confidence rates between
electronic voters with access to a VVPAT device and voters who cast a paper ballot.

Same Day Voter Registration in North Carolina

admin — Thu, 26 Jun 2008 14:39:36 -0700

We have analyzed the likely impact on voter turnout should North Carolina adopt same day registration. Under the system proposed in North Carolina, eligible voters who miss the 25 day registration deadline may take advantage of same day registration during a period that lasts 19 days to three days prior to the election. During this time, voters may go to designated locations, and with the appropriate documentation, both register and vote. Since no state uses a system exactly like the one proposed in North Carolina, we estimated the impact of adopting Election Day Registration (EDR) to simulate the impact of same day registration in North Carolina. While our results must be interpreted carefully, we believe that they represent faithful estimates of the proposed reform. Availability of same day registration procedures similar to traditional Election Day Registration procedures should give voters who have not previously registered the opportunity to vote. Since North Carolina currently has one of the most restrictive registration requirements in the nation, requiring registration 25 days prior to Election Day, we may in fact be underestimating the impact of the proposed reform.

Consistent with existing research on the impact of EDR in other circumstances, we found that SDR would likely lead to substantial increases in voter turnout. We offer the following estimates of increases in turnout for North Carolina, and for specific groups of North Carolinians under SDR:

Overall turnout could go up by 5.4 percent.
Turnout among those aged 18 to 25 could increase by 10.8 percent.
Turnout for those who have moved in the last six months could increase by 9 percent.
Turnout for African Americans could increase by 5.9 percent
Turnout among the poorest citizens could increase by 6 percent, while turnout among the wealthiest citizens would likely increase by only 3.2 percent.

Internet Voting in the March 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Estonia

admin — Thu, 26 Jun 2008 13:29:36 -0700

This study presents and analyzes the results of a survey among the electorate of the Estonian parliamentary elections held on 4 March 2007. The primary focus of the analysis lies on the newly introduced possibility of voting via the Internet in these elections. The application of this pioneering voting channel gave the elections an exclusive character and provoked enormous attention in the political as well as in the scientific community. The use of e-voting in the Estonian parliamentary elections is a remarkable world-première: for the first time an electorate could vote over the Internet in elections of a national parliament. Overall, 30.275 voters have used the possibility of e-voting, which corresponds to 5.4 percent of the participating voters.

Internet Voting in Estonia

admin — Fri, 20 Jun 2008 16:25:59 -0700

Several countries have conducted Internet voting trials in binding public elections over the past decade, including Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These trials have been conducted at the local and regional levels of government, targeting specific populations of voters. However, Estonia—a former Soviet republic and now a full member of the European Union—has advanced the farthest in deploying Internet voting. Since 2000, Estonia has conducted two national elections in which all voters could use Internet voting. The first election, in October 2005, was for local offices and the second election, in March 2007, was a national parliamentary election. In this article, we discuss the context for the Estonian experience in deploying Internet voting. We focus on how the Estonians have systematically addressed the legal and technical considerations required to make Internet voting a functioning voting platform, as well as the political and cultural framework that promoted this innovation. Using data from our own qualitative and quantitative studies of the Estonian experience, we consider who voted over the Internet in these elections, and the political implications of the voting platform. Finally, we consider the lessons that other countries can learn from the Estonian experience.

Preliminary Voting -- Prevoting

admin — Thu, 19 Jun 2008 15:56:51 -0700

We introduce the notion of preliminary voting, or pre-voting, wherein a voter deposits—perhaps over the Internet—a preliminary vote or prevote with election authorities at some time before the close of elections. Prevotes are not official votes, and need not be kept private; indeed, election officials might, as a matter of announced policy, publish the list of received prevotes together with the names of the voters submitting such prevotes. With prevoting, a voter must visit a polling site to make any ﬁnal adjustments to his prevote in private, and to actually cast her (perhaps modiﬁed) prevote.

Whose Absentee Votes Are Counted?

admin — Thu, 19 Jun 2008 15:16:24 -0700

Absentee voting is becoming more prevalent throughout the United States. While there has been some research focused on who votes by absentee ballot, little research has considered another important question about absentee voting: Which absentee ballots are counted, and which are not? Research following the 2000 presidential election has studied the problem of uncounted ballots for precinct voters, but not for absentee voters. To study which absentee ballots are counted we use data from Los Angeles County – the nation’s largest and most diverse voting jurisdiction – for the November 2002 general election. We develop three hypotheses regarding the likelihood that various types of ballots will be counted, which we test with our unique absentee voting dataset. We find that uniform service personnel, overseas civilians, and language minority voters have a much higher likelihood that their ballots will not be counted compared with the general absentee voting population. We conclude our paper with a discussion of the implications of our research for the current debates about absentee voting.

Making Voting Easier: Election Day Registration in New York

admin — Wed, 18 Jun 2008 14:31:57 -0700

As policy makers, election officials, and the public consider whether New York should change the way in which voters are allowed to register to participate in elections, and bring New York State election law into compliance with the Help America Vote Act, we provide an analysis of the potential impact of election dar registration (EDR) in New York. The current system of registration is one in which citizens must register 25 days before election day in order to be eligible to vote. Under EDR this advance registration barrier would be eliminated as citizens could register on election day.

It is important to note that our analysis of the effects of EDR on turnout is based on the experiences of other EDR states, which allow same day registration at the polling place. A legislative proposal currently under consideration in New York (A.5762) would require voters to register on election day at a location other than the polling place. Hence, the actual impact on turnout of EDR in New York is likely to be less than the estimates we report here. This is because EDR in New York would entail two steps: reistration at a local board of elections, and then casting a ballot at the appropriate local polling place. A second bill (A.5800) would rescind the current state constitution requirement that voter registration take place at least 10 days before elections.

Our findings may be broadly categorized in three ways. First, EDR should help increase voter registration and turnout in New York. In particular, our analysis finds that adjusting for the effects of age, mobility, and many other factors, New York could see its long-run turnout rate increase by as much as 8.6 percentage points in presidential elections. This means that turnout in the 2000 presidential election in New York could have been as high as 59 percent if EDR has been in place.

Second, EDR is likely to make voting easier for citizens who have the most difficulty maintaining an up-to-date voter registration record in New York. Our analysis predicts as much as:

A 12.3 percentage point increase in turnout by 18-to-25-year-olds
A 9.8 percentage point increase in turnout by those with a grade school education or less
An 11 point increase in turnout by Latinos and an 8.7 percentage point increase in turnout by African Americans
A 10.1 percentage point increase in turnout by those who have lived at their current address for less than six months
A 12.2 percentage point increase in turnout by naturalized citizens

Third, New York could mitigate or avoid the problems commonly advanced by EDR opponents: added burdens on election administration, cost, and potential voter fraud. We address these concerns below. We show that states like Minnesota and Wisconsin that currently use EDR have developed effective laws and procedures that serve to minimize or eliminate these problems. We argue that should New York move to EDR, it too could mitigate or eliminate these problems through effective laws and procedures. And there is no reason to believe that implementation, as described in A.5762, would lead to increased voter fraud.

The Perverse Consequences of Electoral Reform in the United States

admin — Thu, 12 Jun 2008 13:46:06 -0700

A number of electoral reforms have been enacted in the United States in the past three decades that are designed to increase turnout by easing restrictions on the casting of ballots. Both proponents and opponents of electoral reforms agree that these reforms should increase the demographic representativeness of the electorate by reducing the direct costs of voting, thereby increasing turnout among less-privileges groups who, presumably, are most sensitive to the costs of coming to the polls. In fact, these reforms have been greatly contested because both major political parties believe that increasing turnout among less-privileged groups will benegit Democratic politicians. I review evidence from numerous studies of electoral reform to demonstrate that reforms designed to make it easier for registered voters to cast their ballots actually increase, rather than reduce, socioeconomic biases in the composition of the voting public. I conclude with a recommendation that we shift the focus of electoral reform from an emphasis on institutional changes to a concentration on political engagement.

Fixing the Vote

admin — Thu, 12 Jun 2008 13:37:13 -0700

Electronic voting machines promise to make elections more accurate than ever before, but only if certain problems -- with the machines and the wider electoral process -- are rectified.

The Likely Consequences of Internet Voting for Political Representation

admin — Thu, 12 Jun 2008 11:57:10 -0700

In this Article, Professors R. Michael Alvarez and Jonathan Nagler consider the consequences of Internet voting for political representation. They believe that based on the evidence presented Internet voting is likely to exacerbate the current problem of class-bias in American elections if it is introduced any time in the near future. The authors maintain that previous reforms to ease voting or registration have tended to be taken advantage of by those of higher socio-economic status. Similarly, based on the current digital divide, Internet voting is a reform ripe to be taken advantage of by those with higher socio-economic status. Adopting a system of voting whereby people of sufficient means can vote from the convenience of their homes using a technology they find routine and regularly use, while people of lesser means must brave the uncertain weather of early November to find a local polling place, hardly seems like an election reform likely to lead to fairer or more representative elections. But right now, Internet voting would be the equivalent of “motor-voter: for luxury car drivers only.”