Principal-Agent Theory

Controlling Democracy: The Principal-agent Problems In Election Administration

Submitted by admin on Fri, 06/13/2008 - 11:25.

Author(s):

R. Michael Alvarez

Thad E. Hall

Journal:

Policy Studies Journal

pp:

491-510

Date Published:

01/01/2009

Election reform has become a major issue since the 2000 election, but little consideration has been given to the issues associated with managing them. In this article, we use principal agent theory to examine the problems associated with Election Day polling place voting. We note that Election Day voting manifests problems that agency theory shows are difficult to overcome, including adverse selection of and shirking by poll workers.

Why Everything That Can Go Wrong Often Does: An Analysis of Election Administration Problems

Submitted by admin on Thu, 06/12/2008 - 10:37.

Working Paper No.:

Date Published:

01/01/2009

Author(s):

Thad E. Hall, The Century Foundation

R. Michael Alvarez, Caltech

Before the 2000 presidential election, few citizens in the United States paid much attention to election administration. But scholars have noted that election administration has been a problem for decades. Despite the attention paid to election administration in the research literature, most public policy efforts in since 2000 have been focused on purchasing new voting equipment and fixing problematic procedures, and not on resolving some of the underlying problems in the process of conducting elections in America.