Neal McBurnett, Richard T. Carback, David Chaum, Jeremy Clark, John Conway, Aleksander Essex, Paul S. Herrnson, Travis Mayberry, Stefan Popoveniuc, Ronald L. Rivest, Emily Shen, Alan T. Sherman, and Poorvi L. Vora
This note is a response to, and critique of, recent work by Acemyan, Kortum, Bryne, and Wallach regarding the usability of end-to-end verifiable voting systems, and in particular, to their analysis of the usability of the Scantegrity II voting system. Their work is given in a JETS paper [Ace14] and was presented at EVT/WOTE 2014; it was also described in an associated press release [Rut14]. We find that their study lacked an appropriate control voting system with which to compare effectiveness, and thus their conclusions regarding Scantegrity II are unsupported by the evidence they present. Furthermore, their conclusions are contradicted by the successful deployment experiences of Scantegrity II at Takoma Park.
Michael W. Sances, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Charles Stewart III, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract: To what degree is voter confidence in election procedures driven by satisfaction with the outcome of an election, as opposed to trust in government or objective features of the polling place, such as voting technology? Using approximately 30 national surveys over the past decade, we find a consistent relationship between voting for the winner and confidence in election administration. This confidence varies as a function of question wording and electoral context. Respondents are more confident in the quality of the vote count locally than nationally. They are
Abstract. Continuing the work of Rabin and Rivest  we present another simple and fast method for conducting end to end voting and allowing public verification of correctness of the announced vote tallying results. This method was referred to in  as the SV/VCP method. In the present note voter privacy protection is achieved by use of a simple form of Multi Party Computations (MPC). At the end of vote tallying process, random permutations of the cast votes are publicly posted in the clear, without identification of voters or ballot ids.