Latest Research from the VTP

An N-Version Electronic Voting System

Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Soyini D. Liburd
The ballot battles of the 2000 US Presidential Election clearly indicate that existing voting technologies and processes are not sufficient to guarantee that every eligible voter is granted their right to vote and implicitly to have that vote counted, as per the fifteenth, nineteenth, twenty fourth and twenty sixth amendments to the US constitution. Developing a voting system that is secure, correct, reliable and trustworthy is a significant challenge to current technology.

Application of Lean Management Principles to Election Systems

Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Tomer Posner
No abstract or file available.Lean was first adopted as a management technique for improving results in manufacturing environments. It is based on the 5 principles of identifying the Value to be created, mapping the Value-Stream (incremental addition of value), ensuring process Flow, orienting the process towards the Pull of the customer and finally eliminating all Waste through a process of continuous improvement. This framework is highly adaptable, and has been applied in recent years to non-manufacturing efforts, such as product development and the retail and service industries.

Encrypted Receipts for Voter-Verified Elections Using Homomorphic Encryption

Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Joy Forsythe
Voters are now demanding the ability to verify that their votes are cast and counted as intended. Most existing cryptographic election protocols do not treat the voter as a computationally-limited entity separate from the voting booth, and therefore do not ensure that the voting booth records the correct vote. David Chaum and Andrew Neff have proposed mixnet schemes that do provide this assurance, but little research has been done that combines voter verification with homomorphic encryption.

Auditing Technology for Electronic Voting Machines

Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Sharon Cohen
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machine security has been a significant topic of contention ever since Diebold voting machine code turned up on a public internet site in 2003 and computer scientists at Johns Hopkins University declared the machine “unsuitable for use in a general election.” Since then, many people from computer scientists to politicians have begun to insist that DREs be equipped with a paper trail. A paper trail provides a paper printout for the voter to approve at the end of each voting session.

Verifying Secret-Ballot Elections with Cryptography

Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Ben Adida
No abstract or file available.

Encrypted Receipts for Voter-Verified Elections Using Homomorphic Encryption

Working Paper No.: 
41
Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Joy Forsythe
Voters are now demanding the ability to verify that their votes are cast and counted as intended. Most existing cryptographic election protocols do not treat the voter as a computationally-limited entity separate from the voting booth, and therefore do not ensure that the voting booth records the correct vote. David Chaum and Andrew Neff have proposed mixnet schemes that do provide this assurance, but little research has been done that combines voter verification with homomorphic encryption.

Qualitative Evaluation: "VotoElectronico: Prueba Piloto 2005, Ciudad De Buenos Aires"

Working Paper No.: 
43
Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
R. Michael Alvarez
The Buenos Aires “VotoElectronico” pilot project took place on October 23, 2005, in the City of Buenos Aires. It involved a pilot test of four different electronic voting systems, in at least 43 voting stations located throughout the City. The purpose of this report is to provide initial qualitative assessments of the pilot project. Quantitative analysis will hopefully be presented at a later date, once detailed data from the pilot project are available for examination.

Auditing Technology for Electronic Voting Machines

Working Paper No.: 
46
Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Sharon Cohen
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machine security has been a significant topic of contention ever since Diebold voting machine code turned up on a public internet site in 2003 and computer scientists at Johns Hopkins University declared the machine “unsuitable for use in a general election.” Since then, many people from computer scientists to politicians have begun to insist that DREs be equipped with a paper trail. A paper trail provides a paper printout for the voter to approve at the end of each voting session.

Advances in Cryptographic Voting Systems

Working Paper No.: 
51
Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Ben Adida
Democracy depends on the proper administration of popular elections. Voters should receive assurance that their intent was correctly captured and that all eligible votes were correctly tallied. The election system as a whole should ensure that voter coercion is unlikely, even when voters are willing to be influenced. These conflicting requirements present a significant challenge: how can voters receive enough assurance to trust the election result, but not so much that they can prove to a potential coercer how they voted?

The ThreeBallot Voting System

Working Paper No.: 
56
Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Ronald L. Rivest
We present a new paper-based voting method with interesting security properties. The attempt here is to see if one can achieve the same security properties of recently proposed cryptographic voting protocols, but without using any cryptography, using only paper ballots. We partially succeed. (Initially, I thought the proposal accomplished this goal, but several readers discovered a vote-buying attack (see Section 4.4) that appears to be rather difficult to fix without making the resulting system much less usable in practice.

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